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Abstract
The crash of house prices has become an important feature of macroeconomic crisis.
We argue that the crash of house prices driven by contractionary monetary policy is
not only a reaction, but also accelerates and amplies the uctuations of major macro-
economic variables. The impulse response of consumption to the house price shock
estimated from Bayesian VAR is of same level as that of investment in Hong Kong,
which is distinct from the United States. Therefore, in this paper we conduct a case
study of Hong Kong in the 1997-1998 nancial crisis and quantitatively analyze the
mechanism by developing a general equilibrium model incorporating nancial acceler-
ator in both household and entrepreneur sectors. In addition, we introduce real estate
producers in order to modify the unrealistic mechanism in existing literature. After
estimating the parameters with a combination of calibration and Bayesian method,
the simulated impulse responses imply that our model can explain the co-movement of
house prices, consumption and investment much better than alternative ones. More-
over, the results of variance decomposition show that interest rate shock can explain
most of the house price uctuations, and a substantial fraction of uctuations in major
macroeconomic variables.
I. Introduction
The uctuations of house prices have become one increasingly prominent characteristic
of economic crisis. For example, the recent nancial crisis in the United States was caused
by the collapse of the housing market, which propelled the U.S. economy into the Great
Recession. In fact, researchers have already noted that conditions in the real estate market
played a major role in the rapid meltdown during the 1997-1998 Southeast Asian nancial
crisis (John Quigley, 2001). A notable fact in Hong Kong during this crisis is a slump in
consumption and investment in tandem with a sharp decline in house prices (Figures 1 and
2). However, quantitative studies based on a general equilibrium framework on this issue are
still rare. This paper aims to delve into this area by establishing and estimating a general
equilibrium model incorporating nancial accelerator to understand the interactions between
real estate market uctuations and the aggregate economic dynamics during the Hong Kong
nancial crisis. Throughout this paper, we will focus on the following two questions: (1)
What kind of mechanism causes the crash of house prices? (2) How do house prices inuence
the macroeconomic variables, including output, consumption, and investment?
We nd two empirical observations that are related to the questions that we wish to
address. The rst concerns the source of the continuing decline in property prices during a
recession. Getler et al.(2004) argued that the increase in the world interest rate forced the
central bank to raise the domestic interest rate in order to maintain the xed exchange rate
regime. Therefore, the unexpected uplift of the world interest rate is the root that provoked
the Southeast Asian nancial crisis. There is no fundamental or institutional problem in
Hong Kong, hence we argue that the shock that dampened the Hong Kong housing market
in that crisis might also come from monetary policy. To verify the above idea, a bivariate
Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model with Minnesota prior is used to estimate the
impulse responses of both private house price index and private o¢ ce price index following
a shock to interest rate based on a sample period from 1995 to 1999 (Figures 3 and 4). A
positive shock to interest rate leads to persistent decrease in house price indices, which is in
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line with the ndings of Getler et al. (2004). Therefore, it is reasonable to use the monetary
policy shock as the main shock in our analysis.
The second piece of evidence relates to how property prices impact macroeconomic
variables. We argue that their interactions exist not only in Southeast Asian nancial crisis,
but also for the entire sample period from the 1980s to 2010. Figures 5 to 7 display the
estimated impulse responses of output, consumption, and investment following a shock to
house prices. These impulse responses are also estimated from a BVAR model. A positive
shock to house prices stimulates a persistent increase in macroeconomic variables, among
which the response of investment is the most signicant, followed by consumption and output.
Particularly, the impulse response of consumption is of the same level as investment, which
is distinct from the United States.
To understand these salient features of the data, we propose a general equilibrium
model based on Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG hereafter), which describes how the credit
market channel may form part of the monetary transmission mechanism. We introduce two
distinctive features into the Dynamic New Keynesian sticky price model. The rst one is
that we assume credit constraints exist for both households and entrepreneurs. Thus, both of
them face the optimal nancial contracts and use real estate as collateral to reduce the agency
costs associated with borrowing to nance consumption and investment. When there is an
exogenous interest rate shock, this unanticipated rise depresses the demand for houses, which
in turn decreases the investment and house prices. The unanticipated decline in house prices
dampens the net worth of both homeowners and entrepreneurs, stimulating the external
nance premium, which in turn further depresses investment. Then, a kind of multiplier e¤ect
arises. Moreover, the crash in house prices could directly inuence consumption through
transfers, and output through the decrease in o¢ ce input. Thus, a shift in housing demand
caused by an interest rate shock can lead to large uctuations in house prices, and produce
a broad impact on consumption, investment, and output.
Another feature of our model, compared with other studies, is the introduction of real
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estate producers into the model. Being di¤erent from nal goods producers, real estate
producers manufacture housing services using investment (nal goods) and lands without
being constrained on borrowing. This more convincing assumption improves the treatment
of the supply of housing in existing literature which assumes that housing supply is xed.
To evaluate our model quantitatively, we estimate the model using calibration and
Bayesian method with Hong Kong aggregate time-series data. Compared to models that
only have nancial accelerator in either households or rms, our benchmark model provides
a much better explanation for the co-movements of house prices, investment, and consump-
tion, as well as the persistence of uctuations observed in Hong Kong. Our estimation also
indicates that propagated through nancial accelerators, an interest rate shock alone ac-
counts for about 95% of house prices uctuations, and more than 70% of uctuations in
macroeconomic variables, including consumption and investment.
A strand of recent DSGE literature on property prices assumes that either households
or entrepreneurs are credit constrained, and they use houses or lands as collateral to nance
consumption or investment expenditures (Aoki et al., 2004; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and
Neri, 2010; Liu, Wang and Zha, 2011). Aoki et al. (2004) assume that houses provide housing
services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost for homeowners. They
show that this nancial friction amplies and propagates the e¤ects of the monetary policy
shock on housing investment, house prices, and consumption. Similarly, Iacoviello (2005) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) analyze the relationship between house prices and consumption
based on the idea that consumers are credit constrained, and they use houses as collateral
to nance their consumption. On the other hand, Liu, Wang, and Zha (2011) introduce
a credit constraint into the producer side and explain the positive co-movement between
land prices and investment. Although these models are capable of explaining the interaction
between land prices and consumption or house prices and investment, they have di¢ culty in
delivering positive co-movements of all the three variables simultaneously. Our model can
overcome this di¢ culty since we establish nancial market frictions in both household and
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entrepreneur sectors, and thus form the transmission channels for both consumption and
investment.
Also, our model is di¤erent from the literature focusing on the long-run trend of house
prices by employing the life cycle model (OrtaloMagne et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007; Kiyotaki
et al., 2010). In contrast, we aim to explain the crash of house prices in the short run, es-
pecially during a recession. Our model is also distinctive from the studies of the interaction
between housing market and the macro economy (Case and Shiller, 1988; DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1992). Their concern is the response of the housing market to aggregate uctua-
tions. Instead, we are interested in explaining the fact that the housing market could exert
great impact on macroeconomic variables rather than the other way round.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark model
based on Dynamic New Keyesian sticky price model. Section 3 estimates structural parame-
ters of the model. Section 4 presents the simulation results, drawing comparisons between
alternative models and evaluate the relative importance of shocks. Conclusions are contained
in Section 5.
II. The Benchmark Model
In this section we build a New Keynesian sticky price model incorporating nancial
accelerator mechanism in order to explain the features of the data. The mechanism is antic-
ipated to be developed that a positive shock from monetary policy will generate the crash of
house prices, which amplies and propagates major macroeconomic variables uctuations.
Also, uctuations in macroeconomic variables will further exacerbate house prices decline.
The economy consists of ve types of representative agents: household, entrepreneur, real
estate producer, retailer, and monetary authority. There are three types of commodities:
houses (or o¢ ces for the entrepreneur), nondurable goods and labor. Each household is
treated as a composite of two behavioral types: homeowner and consumer. Homeowners
purchase houses, and then rent them to consumers. Consumersutility depends on non-
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durable goods consumption, housing services and leisure. Entrepreneurs demand o¢ ce and
input them as a production factor to produce wholesales goods. Real estate producers supply
houses and o¢ ces. Retailers di¤erentiate wholesales goods to gain pricing power. Finally,
the monetary authority supports some kind of interest rate rule. Most importantly, bor-
rowing constraints exist in both household and entrepreneur sectors. As their activities are
somewhat conventional, we start with householdsdecision problem.
A. The representative household
The major di¤erence between our model and basic New Keynesian model in household
sector lies on the borrowing constraint in purchasing housing services. To avoid the com-
plexity inherent in modeling the dynamic optimization problem of heterogeneous consumers
under di¤erent borrowing constraints, we follow the method of Aoki et al.(2004). That is,
each household is a combination of two behavioral agents: homeowner and consumer. Ac-
cording to Aoki et al.(2004), this separation has the advantage of making the analysis simple,
but without losing the essence of the nancial accelerator mechanism.
In case of being confused, we rst introduce some useful notations in the model.
1. The CES aggregator of consumption. Consumers demand nondurable con-
sumption goods ct and house services ht. Ct denotes a CES consumption aggregator of the
form
(1) Ct = [
1=c
( 1)=
t + (1  )1=h( 1)=t ]=( 1)
Here nondurable consumption goods ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of di¤erentiated
consumption goods ct(i), indexed by i 2 (0; 1) as
(2) ct = [
Z 1
0
ct(i)
(" 1)="di]"=(" 1)
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Hence the corresponding price index for nondurable consumption goods is given by
(3) Pc;t = [
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 "di]1=(1 ")
Let Pt denotes the composite price index of Ct, which is dened as
(4) Pt = [P
1 
c;t + (1  )P 1 h;t ]1=(1 )
2. Homeowners economic behavior. The house purchase decisions of the house-
hold sector are made by homeowners. At the end of each period, homeowners purchase houses
at price Qt from real estate producers, and then rent them to their consumers at a rental
price Ph;t+1 in the subsequent period. Homeowners nance the purchase of houses partly
with their own net worth available at the end of period t, NHt+1 and partly by borrowing,
bt+1. That is,
qtht+1 = N
H
t+1 + bt+1(5)
qt = Qt=Pt
Homeownersdemand for houses depends on expected marginal return on housing and
expected marginal nancial costs. The expected marginal return Rh;t+1 is given by
(6) Et[Rh;t+1] = Et[
Xh;;t+1 + (1  )qt+1
qt
]
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciate rate of houses, and Xh;t+1 is the rental price relative
to the composite price index.
Then we switch to the expected marginal nancial costs. The rst assumption here
is that homeowners are risk neutral. In the environment with asymmetric information,
homeowners face an external nance premium caused by nancial market imperfection when
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borrowing. For individual homeowners, the return to houses is sensitive to idiosyncratic
risk. When borrowers announce that they cannot repay the debt, the lenders cannot observe
the realized return unless they pay a xed "auditing cost". Hence the uncollateralized
external nancial cost may be more expensive than internal nance due to this "costly state
verication" problem. Thus the optimal contract will be a debt contract. That is when the
borrower announces he is unable to repay, the lender takes possession of all the borrowers
assets. Following BGGs derivation, the external nance premium can be expressed as a
decreasing function of the net worth to asset ratio, NHt+1=qtht+1, according to the optimal
contract. The optimality condition for homeownersdemand for houses is given by
Et[Rh;t+1] = f(N
H
t+1=qtht+1)Rt+1(7)
f
0
< 0
where Rt+1 is the riskless real interest rate. The assumption of risk neutrality guarantees
that (7) holds for the aggregate level.
Since external nancial premium depends on homeownersnancial condition, the evo-
lution of net worth is the key to determine homeownersdemand on houses. Let V Ht denote
the value of homeowners at the beginning of period t, given by
(8) V Ht = Rh;tqt 1ht   f(NHt =qt 1ht)Rt(qt 1ht  NHt )
Then homeownersnet worth can be dened as
(9) Nt+1 = Vt  Dt
whereDt is homeownerstransfer to consumers. The transferDt in our model represents
the distribution of housing equity between homeowners and consumers. This setting is to
capture the important economic behavior in the reality that households use their housing
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equity to nance consumption. Thus the link between house prices and consumption has
been established. Households face the trade-o¤ between current consumption and future
nance premium. The rise of house prices can increase the transfer and hence consumption
and utility today. However, this also implies a decrease in homeowners net worth, and
an increase in the future nance premium. The optimal allocation should depend on some
factors such as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and future income uncertainty.
Following Aoki et al.(2004), to make it simple, we set the transfer to be an increasing function
in the net worth of household relative to their assets. That is,
Dt = (N
H
t+1=qtht+1)(10)

0
> 0
3. Consumers economic behavior. There are two types of consumers in our
economy: normal consumers and Rule-of-Thumb(ROT) consumers. Normal consumers have
accumulated enough wealth, thus they make standard intertemporal and intratemporal deci-
sions. ROT consumers dont have su¢ cient wealth to smooth consumption. Their marginal
propensity to consume is higher than that of the former due to borrowing constraints or
impatience. In general, ROT consumers can represent young people in the society.
3.1. The representative normal consumersutility maximization problem is
(11) maxEt
1X
k=0
k[logCpt+k   
(Mp)1+'t+k
1 + '
]
s:t: PtC
p
t +Bt+1 = WtC
p
t +R
n
t Bt + t
where superscript p denotes normal consumers, Cpt is the consumption of composite
goods, MPt is labor supply, R
n
t is the riskless nominal interest rate, Wt is the nominal wage.
3.2. The income of ROT consumers come from wage income and the transfer paid out
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by homeowners. And they will consume all their current income and save none at the end
of each period (Campell and Mankiw, 1989). In order to guarantee enough income, ROT
consumers supply labor inelastically. The consumption of the ROT consumers is given by
(12) Crt = wt +Dt
where superscript r denotes ROT consumers, wt is the real wage.
3.3 The fraction of normal consumers in the economy is 0 < np < 1. Thus, aggregate
consumption is then
(13) Ct = npC
p
t + (1  np)Crt
Correspondingly, the aggregate labor supply is
(14) Mt = npM
p
t + (1  np)
B. The representative entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs combine o¢ ces with labor to produce wholesale products according to a
constant return to scale production function. We describe entrepreneursproduction process
with a Cobb-Douglas production function, given by
(15) Yt = F (Mt; Ot) = AtM1 t O

t
where At is an exogenous technology, Ot is the aggregate amount of o¢ ces purchased
by entrepreneurs in period t  1, Mt is the labor input.
Similarly, entrepreneurs have the borrowing constraint problem as homeowners in pur-
chasing houses. Entrepreneurs purchase o¢ ces at price Qt in each period for the use in the
subsequent period. However, entrepreneurs cant nance the purchase of o¢ ces solely with
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their own net worth. For individual entrepreneurs, the return to o¢ ces is sensitive to idio-
syncratic risk, which is not observable for lenders. Therefore, entrepreneurs face the external
nance premium when borrowing. And the optimal borrowing contract guarantees riskless
real interest rate for lendersexpected return. The demand for o¢ ces depends on expected
return and expected marginal nancial costs. The expected return of o¢ ce Ro;t+1 is dened
as
(16) Et[Ro;t+1] = Et[
Xc;t+1
Xt+1
Yt+1
Ot+1
+ (1  )qt+1
qt
]
where Xc;t is the price of nondurable goods relative to composite goods, Xt is the gross
markup of retail goods over wholesale goods,  is the depreciate rate.
Following BGG, external nance premium is the decreasing function of the ratio of net
worth to assets value in the optimal contract. Be analogous to homeowners, the optimal
demand for o¢ ce is given by
Et[Ro;t+1] = (N
E
t+1=qtOt+1)Rt+1(17)

0
< 0
The dynamic behavior of o¢ ce demand depends on the evolution of entrepreneursnet
worth, Nt+1. The more net worth entrepreneurs have, the more mortgage they can get. Thus
in the equilibrium entrepreneurs can postpone their consumption to accumulate enough net
worth until they dont need to borrow. In order to prevent this, entrepreneurs are assumed
to have a probability  to survive into next period at the end of each period. Entrepreneurs
net worth is dened as
(18) NEt+1 = V
E
t +W
E
t
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(19) V Et = Ro;tqt 1ot   (NEt =qt 1ot)Rt(qt 1ot  NEt )
where NEt is entrepreneursnet worth, V
E
t is entrepreneursequity. Then entrepreneurs
who fail in period t consume the residual equity which is
(20) CEt = (1  )V Et
C. The representative real estate producer
One feature of our model is the elastic housing supply, which distinguishes our model
from other literature that assumes xed housing supply (Iacoviello 2005, Liu, Wang and Zha
2011). Real estate producers input land and nal goods to produce housing services. Then
real estate producers sell housing services to homeowners and entrepreneurs at a nominal
price Qt. The production function of houses is given by
(21) Zt = L1 I

z;t
where Zt is the ow of houses, L is the land input, Iz;t is the nal goods input. Following
the method of Kiyotaki et al. (2011), the supply of land is xed. This assumption generates
the following mechanism: the more fraction the land value takes in housing value, the more
violently house prices response to the exogenous shock. Peng and Wheaton (1994) provided
empirical evidence supporting this in Hong Kong by econometric tests under the restriction of
land supply set by Hong Kong government. According to the principle of prot maximization,
the house price Qt is given by
(22) Qt =
1

Pc;tL
 1I1 z;t
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The stock of houses Tt is
(23) Tt = (1  )Tt 1 + Zt
Tt can be used as houses or o¢ ces interchangeably. The real estate market clear condi-
tion is
(24) Tt = ht +Ot
D. Retailer
As is standard in literature, to motivate sticky prices we modify the model to allow for
monopolistic competition retailers. Retailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, and
then di¤erentiate them. Retailers have the power of pricing and sell their products Yt(i) at
the price Pc;t(i). In each period, only a fraction 1   of retailers are allowed to change their
prices (Calvo,1983). Hence, retailer i choose the optimal price P c;t to maximize the expected
discounted prots
(25) max
1X
k=0
kEt 1[t;k
P c;t   Pwt
Pt
Y t+k(i)]
where t;k =  ctct+k is the household intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, P
w
t =
Pc;t
Xt
is the nominal price of wholesale goods. The aggregate price evolves according to
(26) Pc;t = [P 1 "c;t 1 + (1  )(Pc;t)1 "]
1
1 "
In the economy, nal goods can be dened as a CES aggregator of retail goods.
(27) Y ft = [
Z 1
0
Yt(i)
(" 1)="di]"=(" 1)
Final goods can be used as nondurable goods consumption, entrepreneursconsumption,
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investment and government expenditure. The economy resource constraint is
(28) Y ft = ct + C
e
t + Iz;t +Gt
E. Monetary Authority
Since our mode aims to quantify the responses of house prices and macroeconomic
variables to the monetary policy shock, the existence of monetary authority is necessary. The
monetary authority in our model is assumed to support a Taylor rule. Monetary authority
adjusts the interest rate to meet two aims: targeted ination rate and smoothed interest
rate. When there is an exogenous interest rate shock, the unanticipated rise in nominal
interest rate depresses the demand of houses, which in turn decreases the investment and
house prices. The unanticipated decline in the asset prices decreases net worth in both
homeowners and entrepreneurs part, stimulating the external nance premium, which in
turn further depresses investment. Then a kind of multiplier e¤ect arises. The crash in
house prices directly inuence consumption through transfers Dt and output through the
decrease in o¢ ce input Ot.
Until now, the complete DSGE model has been established. We will log-linearize the
rst order conditions and market clear conditions to study the responses of economic system
to exogenous shocks.
III. Calibration and Bayesian Estimation
The time unit in the model is meant to be a quarter. We assign values to the structural
parameters using a combination of calibration and econometric estimation techniques.
We calibrate most parameters using long-run data relations from Hong Kong as well as
parameter values that are common in related studies. We set the quarterly discount factor
 to 0:99, which also pins down the steady state quarterly riskless rate R =  1. The values
assigned to C=Y; Iz=Y;G=Y are 0:6; 0:25 and 0:2 respectively, which are in accord with the
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history average of Hong Kong. The share of consumption accruing to entrepreneurslabor
accordingly equals to 0:05. The value assumed for  implies that housing rent expenditure
accounts for 12% of total consumption at the steady state. According to statistics from Hong
Kong Rating and Valuation Department, the annual rate of return for private houses and
private o¢ ces are 4:8% and 8:4% respectively. We therefore set Rh = 1:012 and Ro = 1:021.
As is also within convention, the capital share  is 0:35. We assume rmsquarterly survival
rate is 0:973 according the bankruptcy and merge data of listed companies in Hong Kong.
We set the probability a rm does not change its price within a given period, , equal to 0.75,
implying that the average time between price adjustment is four quarters. In the monetary
policy rule, we set the autoregressive parameter, , to 0.95 and the coe¢ cient  on ination
equal to 2, which are standard and make the interest rate smooth.
The parameters governing the nancial accelerator are similar to those used in BGG.
We dene householdsleverage ratio h as one minus debt to disposable income ratio. We
calibrate it as 1=1:4, which is in line with the average value observed in Hong Kong. Firms
leverage ratio is set as 0:5, the same as BGG. The elasticity of the external nance premium
with respect to leverage is an important parameter in our model as it determines the bor-
rowing ability for rms and households. Since there is no way to identify it in the factual
data, we set this elasticity for households equal to 0:1 following Aoki et al. (2004), and set
it as 0:05 for rms according to BGG. The appendix table presents the calibrated parameter
values.
We estimate the remaining parameters of the model using Bayesian methods and Hong
Kong data on output, private consumption and house price index over the period 1980Q1
to 2010Q4. Specically, we estimate seven structural parameters, namely, the ve ratios
or elasticity parameters that can not be calibrated accurately, O=T; ! = w=cr; np; s; , and
parameters dening the stochastic process of shocks, g and a. As Liu et al. (2011), we
impose Beta prior distributions on all structure parameters except s. The mean of these prior
distributions are set as the calibrated values in Aoki et al. (2004). Aoki et al. (2004) argued
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that the elasticity of transfer with respect to housing equity changed from 3 to 30 based on
UK history; therefore, we assume that the prior for adjustment factor s in the dividend rule
follows a uniform distribution over [3; 30]. We also estimate three nonstructural parameters,
er; eg; ea, representing the standard deviations of i.i.d. errors with inverse gamma prior
distributions. The prior distributions are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 also reports the estimates of structural and shock parameters at the posterior
mode along with standard deviations. The steady ratio O=T is estimated as 0:4275, implying
that private o¢ ces occupy 42.75% of the total produced houses. The estimated ratio of wage
to consumption for ROT consumer, !, is 83.36%. The ratio of common consumer, np, is
estimated to 74.02%. These parameters are broadly in line with those reported in literature
(Aoki et al., 2004; Iacoviello, 2005). The estimated parameter  (0:1060) in housing pro-
duction function implies that land value accounts for nearly 90% of housing values. Davis
and Heathcotes (2007) empirical evidence shows that uctuations in real estate values are
primarily driven by changes in land prices. Liu et al.(2011) also regards land as the main
factor in the housing market that their DSGE model focus on land prices and macroeconomic
uctuations. Therefore, we believe the housing production function in our model is reason-
able estimated. Finally, the estimation reveals that the two common shocks government
expenditure shock and technology shock are persistent and have a modest deviation.
IV. Model Results Analysis
A. E¤ects of amplication and persistence
So how well does the nancial accelerator work in our world? In this section, we present
some impulse responses of the model to a contractionary monetary policy shock. There are
two ways to evaluate the amplication and persistence e¤ects of our benchmark model.
The rst one is to compare the impulse responses of our model to those of actual data.
From the results of BVAR model in section 2, the responses of investment to the house
price shock has the largest magnitude, followed by the responses of consumption, and that
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of output is the last. Besides that, private house price index and private o¢ ce price index
response negatively to a positive shock in interest rate. Those are the results we want to
match in our model.
Figure 8 displays the impulse responses of major macroeconomic variables in our bench-
mark model. The shadow areas represent the 68% posterior probability bands. In the linear
equilibrium system, we introduce a positive interest rate shock and generate the impulse
responses of house price, output, consumption and investment. From the perspective of
amplication e¤ect, house price, output and consumption all drop by 20%. And investment
drops most, more than 25%. As we switch to the persistence e¤ect, consumption takes
10 periods to recover and output takes 15 periods, and house prices and investment need
more than 25 periods to return to steady state. These impulse responses match the BVAR
evidence well.
The second way to examine the e¤ects of the model is to compare impulse responses
generated by the benchmark model to those of alternative models which turn o¤ nancial
accelerator in either household sector or entrepreneur sector. The parameters in alternative
models take the same values of those estimated in benchmark model. Figure 9 highlights the
e¤ect on house price, output, consumption and investment when nancial accelerator turns
o¤ in the household sector. Investment drops almost 25%, which is the same as the bench-
mark model, whereas the amplication e¤ect on house price, output and consumption is
much weaker, which drops by 17%, 17%, and 15% respectively. Surprisingly, the persistence
of impulse response that takes all variables 40 periods to recover contradicts with our intu-
ition. In the other alternative model which is showed in gure 10, we correspondingly turn
o¤ nancial accelerator in entrepreneur sector. Both the amplication and persistence ef-
fects become weaker than our benchmark model. The peak responses of house price, output,
consumption and investment to monetary policy shock are 14%, 15%, 17%, and 18%. As is
expected, all variables only need 10 periods to return to steady state. Obviously, compared
with these alternative models, our benchmark model has advantages in both amplication
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and persistence.
B. What shocks drive the house prices?
Our estimated model helps us assess the relative importance of the shocks in driving
uctuations in house prices and macroeconomic variables. We do this through variance
decompositions. Table 2 reports the results of house prices and several key macroeconomic
variables across the 3 types of structural shocks at forecasting horizons between the impact
period (1Q) and six years after the initial shocks (24Q).
A neutral technology shock (i.e., a TFP shock) contributes little to house price uctua-
tions, though it accounts for a substantial fraction of uctuations in investment, consumption
and output. The reason lies in the fact that it can only move house prices in entrepreneur
sector, thus its impact is much less amplied through nancial acceleration. This nding is
consistent with Liu et al. (2011), who report weak amplication and propagation e¤ects of
macroeconomic variables following a TFP shock after incorporating nancial frictions into
their DSGE model. A shock to government demand explains little of the uctuations in
house prices and key macroeconomic variables. This is intuitive based on the reason that it
can only inuence variables through the increase in demands for nal goods, which is both
indirect and weak.
In contrast, the interest rate shock drives more than 97% of house price uctuations.
Working through nancial accelerators in both households and rms, the interest rate shock
causes a substantial fraction of uctuations in investment (about 80%), consumption (about
83-90%) and output (about 82-90%). This nding corroborates the results obtained by
Jermann and Quadrini (2009) and Aoki et al. (2004), which showed that nancial shocks
can impact the borrowing ability of rms and households, and thus play an important role
in business cycles.
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V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the crash of house prices and its inuence on major macroeco-
nomic variables through the case of Hong Kong during the Southeast Asian nancial crisis.
First, we establish the responses of output, consumption, and investment to the house price
shock using bivariate Bayesian VAR models and identify the interest rate shock as the one
that results in the crash of house prices. Then in order to implement quantitative studies in a
general equilibrium framework, we build a model with nancial accelerator mechanism exits
both in the household and entrepreneur sectors. The model focuses on the macroeconomic
e¤ects of imperfections in credit markets due to asymmetric information. Such imperfections
generate external nancial premium on households and entrepreneurs when they raise funds
to nance their housing purchase. Moreover, the external nancial premium is a function
of net worth, which heavily depends on house prices. When a positive interest rate shock
comes, the decline in house prices raises the external nancial premium, which leads to a
reduction in housing demand. Thus, the nancial accelerator in both sectors amplies and
propagates the uctuations in house prices and macroeconomic variables.
We use the combination of calibration and Bayesian estimation to assign values to the
structural parameters and compare the impulse responses of our benchmark model with those
of two alternative models. We conclude that our model can match the data well and exert
better e¤ects in both amplication and persistence than models with nancial accelerator
solely exits in household sector or entrepreneur sector.
In the subsequent research we will extend our model to a small open economy. Given the
important role of the foreign exchange rate regime in economic activities not only in Hong
Kong, but also in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia, with su¢ cient data preparation in
these emerging countries, we would like to investigate the inuence of foreign exchange rate
regime on house prices and other macroeconomic variables.
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Table 1 Prior and Posterior Distribution
Prior Posterior
Parameter Distribution Mean S.D. Mode S.D. T stat.
O=T Beta 0.4 0.1 0.4275 0.1473 2.9028
! Beta 0.6 0.1 0.8336 0.0619 13.4607
np Beta 0.5 0.1 0.7402 0.0589 12.5654
s Uniform 3(min) 30(max) 3.0000 0.0557 53.8546
 Beta 0.4 0.1 0.1060 0.0337 3.1513
g Beta 0.85 0.1 0.7415 0.0449 16.5037
a Beta 0.85 0.1 0.7458 0.0430 17.3546
er Inv. Gamma 0.2 2 0.0236 0.0003 77.2450
eg Inv. Gamma 0.2 2 0.2339 00161 14.5079
ea Inv. Gamma 0.2 2 0.1266 0.0218 5.8028
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Table 2 Variance decompositions of aggregate quantities
Horizon Interest Rate Government Demand TFP (Technology)
House Price
1Q 96.39 0.33 3.28
4Q 98.18 0.21 1.61
8Q 97.92 0.16 1.93
16Q 97.70 0.11 2.18
24Q 97.68 0.10 2.22
Investment
1Q 88.57 0.05 11.38
4Q 79.63 0.11 20.26
8Q 77.57 0.12 22.31
16Q 78.97 0.11 20.92
24Q 80.09 0.10 19.81
Consumption
1Q 97.56 0.00 2.44
4Q 88.14 0.03 11.83
8Q 83.86 0.06 16.09
16Q 83.44 0.06 16.51
24Q 83.74 0.06 16.21
Output
1Q 94.08 0.97 4.95
4Q 85.58 0.74 13.68
8Q 82.62 0.63 16.75
16Q 83.10 0.56 16.33
24Q 83.82 0.53 15.65
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Figure 1: Seasonal adjusted House Prices Index and Consumption from 1995 to 2005, with
the nancial crisis phase represented by the shaded part (i.e., from 1997 Q3 to 1999 Q4).
Figure 2: Seasonal adjusted O¢ ce Price Index and Investment from 1995 to 2005, with the
nancial crisis phase represented by the shaded part (i.e., from 1997 Q3 to 1999 Q4).
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Figure 3: Impluse response to a shock to the interest rate. Note: House price is measured with the
private house price index. Interest rate is measured with the six-month foreign exchange funds rate. Solid
lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model based on monthly data from January
1995 to December 1999. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability bands.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate. Note: O¢ ce price is measured with
the private o¢ ce price index. Interest rate is measured with the six-month foreign exchange funds rate. Solid
lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model based on monthly data from January
1995 to December 1999. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability bands.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to a shock to the house price index. Note: House price is measured
with the private house price index. Solid lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVARmodel
based on quarterly data from 1980 Q1 to 2010 Q4. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability
bands.
Figure 6: Impulse response to a shock to the house price index. Note: House price is measured with
the private house price index. Solid lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model
based on quarterly data from 1980 Q1 to 2010 Q4. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability
bands.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a shock to o¢ ce price index. Note: O¢ ce price is measured with
the private o¢ ce price index. Solid lines represent the estimated responses from a bivariate BVAR model
based on quarterly data from 1986Q1 to 2010Q4. Darked parts represent the 68% posterior probability
bands.
Figure 8: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate after turning o¤ the nancial
accelerator in household sector
Figure 10: Impulse responses to a shock to the interest rate after turning o¤ the nancial
accelerator in entrepreneur sector
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A Appendix: The Complete Log-Linearized Model
1. Aggregate demand
(A1) yt =
c
Y
ct +
Ce
Y
cet +
Iz
Y
iz;t +
G
Y
gt
(A2) Cpt =  rt+1 + Cpt+1
(A3) Crt = !wt + (1  !)dt
(A4) Ct = npC
p
t + (1  np)Crt
(A5) ct = Ct   xc;t
(A6) ht = Ct   xh;t
(A7) xct = #x
h
t
(A8) rht+1 = rt   h
 
nht+1   qt   ht+1

(A9) rht+1 = (1  h)xht + hqt+1   qt
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(A10) dt = s(nht+1   qt   ht+1)
(A11) rht+1 = rt   o
 
net+1   qt   ot+1

(A12) rht+1 = (1  o)(yt+1   ot+1 + xct+1   xt+1) + oqt+1   qt
(A13) qt = (1  )iz;t + xc;t
(A14) tt =
O
T
ot +
h
T
ht
(A15) cet = (1=
o)rot + (1  1=o) rt +

1 + o
o   1
o

net 1   o
o   1
o
(qt 1 + ot)
2. Aggregate supply
(A16) yt = at + (1  )mt + ot
(A17) wt = yt  mt   xt + xc;t
(A18) Cpt + 'm
p
t = wt
(A19) mt = m
p
t
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(A20) zt = iz;t
(A21) t = ( xt) + t+1
3. The evolution of state variables
(A22)
nht+1 = R
h[(1=h)rht + (1  1=h)rt + (1 + h
h   1
h
)nht 1  h
h   1
h
(qt 1 + ht)]  (Rh  1)dt
(A23) net+1 =  Ro[(1=o)rot + (1  1=o)rt + (1 + o
o   1
o
)net 1   o
o   1
o
(qt 1 + ot)]
(A24) t = (1  )tt 1 + zt
4. Monetary policy and shock processes
(A25) rnt = r
n
t 1 + (1  )t 1 + ernt
(A26) gt = ggt 1 + e
g
t
(A27) at = aat 1 + e
a
t
(A28) rnt = rt + t+1
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(A1) is the goods market clearing. (A2) and (A3) are the consumers rst-order condi-
tions for consumption. (A4) is the aggregate consumption of normal consumers and ROT
consumers. The demand for nondurable goods and house services are (A5) and (A6). (A7)
is the price relationship. The external nance premium for homeowners and entrepreneurs
are (A8) and (A11). The denitions of return for house and o¢ ce are respectively (A9) and
(A12). (A10) represents the transfer rule. (A13) is the house price denition and (A14) is
the house market clearing. The entrepreneurs consumption is (A15).
(A16) is the production function. The combination of (A17), (A18) and (A19) is the la-
bor market clearing conditions. (A20) is the house production function. The New Keynesian
Phillips Curve is (A21). (A22), (A23) and (A24) are the law of motions for homeowners
net worth, entrepreneurs net worth and house stock. (A25) is Taylor rule. The exogenous
process of government expenditure and productivity are (A26) and (A27). (A28) is the
denition of real interest rate.
29
B Appendix: Parameters Calibration
c
Y
0.6
Ce
Y
0.05
IZ
Y
0.25
G
Y
0.1
 1
# =  1 

-0.14
h = f
0
(h)
f(h)
h 0.1
o = 
0
(o)
(o)
o 0.05
h 1/1.4
o 0.5
h = 1 
Rh
0.978
o = 1 
Ro
0.969
 0.35
 0.01
 0.973
 0.75
 0.99
 0.0858
 2
' 1
Rh 1.012
Ro 1.021
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C Appendix: Household Credit Constrain and Real Estate Producer
In this part we would demonstrate the distinct features of the correlation between res-
idential and commercial housing market in Hong Kong, and provide additional motivation
for modeling real estate producers explicitly in our paper. All our data are o¢ cially issued
by Hong Kong Government, and therefore are of high quality. Particularly, the data of the
residential and commercial land usage comes from rst hand land auction record documented
by Land Department in Hong Kong. The building data comes from the Building Department
in Hong Kong.
Is housing equity an important asset in Hong Kong?
In Hong Kong, the net housing equity takes a large share of households wealth. Figure
A1 displays the ratio of net housing wealth to nominal GDP. The net housing equity in
private residential sector, estimated as the total market value of the private housing stock
minus the total outstanding mortgage balance, was 3.7 trillion in 1997. At the same time,
the total market value of stock market in Hong Kong was 5 trillion. Though the house prices
have declined dramatically since 1997, the net housing equity was still 1.8 trillion in 2000.
Another fact is that the property-related loans accounts for the largest share of total domestic
credit since 1990s. The property-related loans comprise mortgage loans for the purchase of
private residential property and loans for building and construction, property development
and investment. Figure A2 shows this relationship. The actual share of property-related
loans should be higher than the gure shown here because it doesnt include the consumer
and corporate loans extended against property collateral. Although the data on the latter is
not available, the Quarterly Bulletins of Hong Kong Monetary Authority (May 2001, March
2004) argued that there is a widespread practice of using property as collateral for consumer
and business loans in Hong Kong.
31
Figure A1: Ratio of Net Housing Wealth to Nominal GDP
Figure A2: Share of Property-related Loan to Total Dometic Credit
Why should we focus on houses rather than land?
We argue that land cannot reect the uctuations in the housing market of Hong Kong.
First, a considerable proportion of new houses are supplied in the form of building upon
the old ones rather than building on the new land. Figure A3 shows the area ratio of old
extension building to new building for residential and commercial usage. Though changing
sharply from year to year, the average ratio for residential structure is 0.71 while it is 0.82 for
32
commercial structure. Thus, land cant reect the uctuations of the old extension building,
which accounts for a large fraction of the housing market.
Figure A3: Area Ratio of Old Extension to New Building
Secondly, Being di¤erent from American, people of Hong Kong do not buy land and
then build houses by themselves; instead, they buy apartments in high buildings and large
mansions. According to the data from Hong Kong Building Department and Land Depart-
ment, the average oor is 29 for commercial buildings and 10 for dwelling buildings from the
2000 to 2010. It would be far from reality if we put land rather than house into the utility
function of representative household.
Clearly, based on the above two reasons, it is more natural to model the HOUSING
market for Hong Kong rather than the LAND market. Specically, to introduce houses, we
should have real estate producers who use land and other nal goods to build houses. In the
next section, we turn to the land market of Hong Kong.
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Hong Kong land policy: xed land supply
Hong Kong is a city with small amount of land (1,100 sq.km.) relative to its large
population (7,108,100). To preserve enough land for future, the authority auctions its land
user rights every year according to a long-run land program. Most land contracts last for
75 years with some exception of 99 years or 999 years. According to Figure A4, the land
auctioned by the government every year remains at the same level before and after the year
of 2000 respectively, but dropped sharply in 2000. This is mainly because of some political
reasons due to the sovereignty transfer from UK to China and the inuence of SARS. If
we ignore these political and exogenous shocks, it can be argued that there is a certain
amount of new land supplied in the land market, and the amount maintains at the same
level every year. This is the motivation for us to model a xed supply of land, L, for real
estate producers each period.
Figure A4: Yearly Land Area Auctioned by the Government
(Notes: Before the sovereignty transfer in 1997, the prior authority aimed to sell more
land to return funds back to the UK Government. Moreover, owing to the impacts of SARS
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in 2003, the local authority began to use the list system to sell land user rights instead of
the regular land auctions.)
Residential and commercial usage: no substitution
The distinct di¤erence between our model and the prominent work of Liu, Wang, and
Zha (2011) is that we do not depend on the conversion between commercial land and res-
idential land. Rather, we have a supply of new houses every period produced by the real
estate producer. The new houses are added to the housing stock and then reallocated among
households and entrepreneurs. The transform from residential houses to business o¢ ces is
not likely to happen since we have the credit constrain both in the household sector and
entrepreneur sector. We would show that our mechanism is much better at least for the case
of Hong Kong.
Figure A5: Land Area for Residential Usage and Business Usage
We rst check the land data. Figure A5 shows the scatter between land areas for
residential use and business use. This is a yearly data from 1986 to 2010, and each point in
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the gure represents a specic year. As the tted line shows, there is a positive correlation
between two distinct land purposes. The correlation is 0.5891 and signicant at the 1% level.
This means there is no substitution between two land styles.
As we have argued before, it is more nature to focus on the buildings rather than land
for Hong Kong housing market. Therefore, we turn to the relationship between residential
and commercial building areas. Figure A6 illustrated the monthly time series of building
areas for two usages from May 2000 to September 2010. Though the variance of business
area is larger than the residential one, their uctuations are generally similar. Figure A7
shows the scatter of residential and commercial housing area. Clearly, they do not own a
negative correlation; instead, the calculated correlation coe¢ cient is 0.0814 and insignicant
at any normal level. This can be understood as a reaction to the common aggregate economic
environments. When the economy is booming, demands for both residential and commercial
structure might be aroused, and vice versa. Thus, a negative relation as in Liu, Wang, and
Zha (2011) is not likely to happen.
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Figure A6: Building Areas for Commercial and Residential Usage (time series)
Figure 11: Figure A7: Housing Areas for Commecial and Residential Usage (scatter)
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